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Abstract
This paper addresses conicting results regarding the optimal taxation of capital income. Judd (1985)
proves that in steady state there should be no taxation of capital income. Lansing (1999) studies a logarithmic
example of one of Judds models and nds that the optimal steady state tax on capital income is not always
zero  it is positive in some specications, negative in some others. There appears to be a contradiction.
However, I show that Lansing derives his result by relaxing the hypotheses of Judds theorem  with less
restrictive hypotheses, a wider range of outcomes is possible. This raises the question of whether yet more
outcomes are possible with yet weaker hypotheses. I nd that the answer is no: the only possible interior
steady states for the model are essentially Judds zero capital tax and Lansings unitary elasticity of marginal
utility.
JEL Classication: H2
Keywords: dynamic optimal taxation
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1 Introduction
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) prove that capital income should not be taxed in a steady state. Lans-
ing (1999) provides a counterexample to this result. The example is particularly intriguing since it is a
special case of one of Judds models. There appears to be a contradiction. Lansing o¤ers explanations to
reconcile the di¤erences. He also considers extensions of the model that revive the zero tax result. However,
one is still left wondering what goes wrong in the counterexample. Lansing states on page 449, Future
research should be directed at developing a solution method that gives the right answer in all cases. Judds
solution method is optimal control theory (as is Lansings). It would be very troubling indeed if optimal
control theory failed to give the right answer. Fortunately, the contradiction can be resolved: Judd and
Lansing have proved two di¤erent theorems with two di¤erent sets of hypotheses. For the special case with
logarithmic utility that Lansing considers, his theorems hypotheses are less restrictive than Judds so the
range of possible outcomes is wider. In particular, Judds zero capital tax result is one possible outcome,
but not the only one.
The hypotheses in question deal with the convergence properties of various co-state variables (Lagrange
multipliers). Kemp, Long, and Shimomura (1993) have also observed that the convergence hypotheses of
Judds theorem might not be satised. Among the possibilities is that the steady state of the economy could
be completely unstable in which case the zero capital tax result may not apply. In Lansings example it
turns out that there is a somewhat di¤erent reason why Judds result does not apply. The issue is not the
local dynamics about the steady state, but rather the dynamical system might not even have a steady state.
Further work regarding the convergence properties has been done by Straub and Werning (2015). They state,
Reinhorn . . . correctly claried that in the logarithmic case the Lagrange multipliers explode, explaining
the di¤erence in resultsbetween Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999). Straub and Werning (2015) also state,
[W]e believe the issue can be framed exactly as Reinhorn . . . did, emphasizing the non convergence of
multipliers.
Since the co-state variables/multipliers are shadow prices that are not observable, one would rather
not make assumptions about their behavior. On the other hand, it is quite reasonable to assume that
observable macroeconomic variables have stable long run behavior since this is consistent with most developed
economies. (E.g., page 304 of Lucas 1990 for the US.) In the case of Judds model, which abstracts from
demographics and technological change, stability boils down to convergence to an interior steady state. Thus,
I study the behavior of the optimal tax on capital income, assuming only that the observable macro variables
converge to positive limits, with no assumptions about co-states.1 I nd that there are only two possible
1Throughout the paper, the theoremshypotheses will be stated in terms of the convergence of endogenous variables. The
theorems do not characterize the primitives (utility functions, production function, parameters, initial condition) that satisfy
convergence. Some primitives will satisfy Judds hypotheses, some will satisfy Lansings, and some neither. However, as
discussed above, it seems reasonable to focus on those primitives that lead to stable long run behavior.
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outcomes: either the modied golden rule holds in the limit or else savings are insensitive to the after-tax
interest rate in the limit. In the former case we get Judds zero tax result. In the latter case, the income
and substitution e¤ects of an interest rate change just cancel, and this is what occurs in Lansings example
with logarithmic utility. If interest does not a¤ect savings, this undermines the benet from a zero tax on
interest/capital income and we can see why Judds result does not necessarily hold in this case.
Straub and Werning (2015) raise serious concerns about Judds convergence hypotheses in the case where
the capitalist in the model has CES utility. In particular, when the capitalists intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is less than one, the solution to the optimal tax problem cannot converge to an interior steady
state. If, in addition, the social welfare function places zero weight on the capitalist and all weight on the
worker, then the solution to the optimal tax problem does converge, but to a non-interior steady state with
a positive tax rate on capital income. Straub and Werning conclude that Judds model cannot be used to
unequivocally justify a zero long run tax on capital income. I agree with Straub and Werning. But since the
CES case with elasticity less than one leads to a non-interior steady state, and since this is inconsistent with
stable long run behavior, I prefer to exclude these utility functions from consideration and instead focus on
utility functions (and other primitives) that do lead to stable long run behavior.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the theorems of Judd and Lansing, explains the rela-
tionship between these two theorems, and also provides the general result described above. Section 4 o¤ers
a concluding comment.
2 Model
The model has four economic actors: capitalist, worker, rm, government. The capitalist has access to the
capital market but does no work. The worker supplies labor inelastically but does not have access to the
capital market. The rm is a price taking prot maximizer that uses capital and labor to produce output.
The government chooses a time path for the tax rate on capital income and uses the proceeds to provide
lump sum transfers to the worker. There is no government debt. Hence the transfers must equal the taxes
at each point in time. We now proceed to describe the model in detail.
The capitalist has an innite horizon and maximizes discounted utility,
R1
0
e tu(cct)dt, where  > 0
is the subjective discount rate and cct  0 is instantaneous consumption. The superscript identies the
capitalist; cwt will be the workers consumption. The instantaneous utility function u is smooth, strictly
increasing, strictly concave, and satises Inada conditions. At the beginning of time the capitalists wealth
consists of the economys entire stock of capital, k0 > 0. This stock of wealth/capital evolves through time
according to the capital accumulation equation: _kt = (1   kt)(rt   )kt   cct where kt is the tax rate on
net capital income (subsidy rate if negative), rt is the pre-tax interest rate gross of depreciation, and  is the
depreciation rate. Note the lack of wage income which reects the assumption that the capitalist supplies no
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labor. For ease of notation, let rt := (1  kt)(rt   ) denote the after tax, net of depreciation, interest rate.
Then the capital accumulation equation is _kt = rtkt cct . Let Rt :=
R t
0
rsds be the cumulative interest factor.
With this denition we can integrate the capital accumulation equation to get e  RT kT  k0 =  
R T
0
e  Rtcctdt.
When T !1 this equation gives the capitalists lifetime budget. In order to prevent Ponzi schemes we will
require that the present value of wealth be non-negative in the limit: limT!1 e 
RT kT  0. Then the lifetime
present value budget constraint is
R1
0
e  Rtcctdt  k0. The capitalist maximizes lifetime utility subject to
this budget. At the solution, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution must equal the ratio of present
value prices, and the budget must hold with equality:
e tu0(cct)=u
0(cc0) = e
  Rt for almost all t  0 and
Z 1
0
e  Rtcctdt = k0: (1)
Equivalently, the rst of these conditions can be log di¤erentiated to give the consumption Euler equation
_cctu
00(cct)=u
0(cct) =  rt. The second equation in (1) can be expressed in its no-Ponzi form as limt!1 e  Rtkt =
0, or, by the rst equation in (1), limt!1 e tu0(cct)kt = 0.
The worker inelastically supplies a ow of one unit of labor and immediately consumes all wages and
transfers due to the lack of access to the capital market. So the worker is a passive actor who makes
no decisions. The instantaneous utility function is v(cwt ). The workers consumption (and income) is c
w
t =
wt+TRt where wt is the wage and TRt is the transfer. The assumptions that were imposed on the capitalists
utility function u are also imposed on v.
The rm is a price taking prot maximizer with constant returns to scale in labor and capital. The
production function in intensive form is f(kt). The capital to labor ratio coincides with the capital stock
since the labor supply is always one unit. We assume that f(0) = 0 and that f satises the same conditions
as the utility functions u and v. At the rms optimum, f 0(kt) = rt and f(kt)  ktf 0(kt) = wt.
Given the restriction against government debt, tax revenue must equal the transfer at each instant:
kt(rt   )kt = TRt. Hence, from the denition of rt and the rms prot maximization condition, TRt =
 rtkt + [f 0(kt)  ]kt. Then the workers consumption is
cwt = wt + TRt = [f(kt)  ktf 0(kt)]  rtkt + [f 0(kt)  ]kt = f(kt)  kt   rtkt: (2)
In equilibrium, consumption plus investment must equal output: cct + c
w
t + kt +
_kt = f(kt). Substitute
for cwt to get _kt = rtkt   cct , which is satised by the capitalists ow budget constraint (WalrasLaw).
3 Optimal taxation
The government maximizes social welfare
R1
0
e t[v(cwt ) + u(c
c
t)]dt subject to the equilibrium conditions:
the capitalist maximizes lifetime utility, the worker consumes all available income, rms maximize prots,
the governments budget is in balance at every instant so the workers income is as described in (2), and
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markets clear. Note that the government applies the capitalists discount factor to both consumers, and the
welfare weight  is time invariant. There is one further constraint: rt  0. This is a policy restriction that
prevents the government from imposing a tax rate in excess of 100 percent. Substitute for cwt from (2) to
get the following problem:
maximize
Z 1
0
e t[v(f(kt)  kt   rtkt) + u(cct)]dt
subject to _kt = rtkt   cct
_cct = (  rt)u0(cct)=u00(cct)
rt  0
with k0 > 0 given and limt!1 e tu0(cct)kt = 0. The optimal time path for the tax rate can be recovered
from the denition of rt. The current value Hamiltonian is
H(k; cc; r; q1; q2; ) = v
 
f(k)  k   rk+ u(cc) + q1(rk   cc) + q2(  r)u0(cc)=u00(cc) + r :
The state variables are kt (with co-state q1t) and cct (with co-state q2t), rt is the control, and t is the
Lagrange multiplier for the constraint rt  0. The optimality conditions are
@H=@k = v0(cwt )[f
0(kt)     rt] + q1trt = q1t   _q1t (3a)
@H=@cc = u0(cct)  q1t + q2t(  rt)

1  [u00(cct)] 2u0(cct)u000(cct)
	
= q2t   _q2t (3b)
@H=@r =  v0(cwt )kt + q1tkt   q2tu0(cct)=u00(cct) + t = 0 (3c)
@H=@q1 = rtkt   cct = _kt (3d)
@H=@q2 = (  rt)u0(cct)=u00(cct) = _cct (3e)
trt = 0; lim
t!1 e
 tq1tkt = 0; lim
t!1 e
 tq2tcct = 0 (3f)
together with the problems two boundary conditions. The last line includes the complementary slackness
and transversality conditions.
3.1 Theorem (Judd)2 Suppose a solution to (3) has the property that kt, cct , rt, and q1t converge as t tends
to innity, with strictly positive limits for kt, cct , and c
w
t . Then limt!1 kt = 0.
Proof Drop the time subscripts to denote limiting values. From (3e),3 r = . Therefore (3a) yields
f 0(k)     r = 0. The theorem now follows from the denition rt = (1  kt)[f 0(kt)  ].
2See theorem 2 and equations (24) on page 72 of Judd (1985).
3The assumption that limt!1 t exists does not always imply limt!1 _t = 0 (e.g., t 1 sin t2). However, this is not a
problem here. Equations (3a, d, e) are of the form _t = G(kt; c
c
t ; rt; q1t) with G continuous, where _t represents _q1t, _kt, or _c
c
t .
Therefore, under stated assumptions, _t has a limit as t tends to innity. That limit must be zero; otherwise t (no dot) would
fail to converge as t tends to innity. A similar argument can be applied to Lansings theorem, and to parts of theorem 3.6,
below.
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In Lansings example, u = log. Then (1) simplies to cct = c
c
0e
Rt t and cc0 = k0. From (3d),
d[e  Rtkt]=dt =  e  Rtcct , so with cct = k0e Rt t this yields d[e  Rtkt]=dt = d[k0e t]=dt. Integrate, and
use R0 = 0 to identify the constant of integration. The result is kt = k0e
Rt t. Hence cct = kt. Substitute
this and u = log into (3) to get:
@H=@k = v0(cwt )[f
0(kt)     rt] + q1trt = q1t   _q1t (4a)
@H=@cc = 1=kt   q1t   q2t(  rt) = q2t   _q2t (4b)
@H=@r =  v0(cwt )kt + q1tkt + q2tkt + t = 0 (4c)
@H=@q1 = rtkt   kt = _kt (4d)
@H=@q2 =  (  rt)kt =  _kt (4e)
trt = 0; lim
t!1 e
 tq1tkt = 0; lim
t!1 e
 tq2tkt = 0: (4f)
This system characterizes the solution to the optimal tax problem when u = log. One of the properties
of (4) is that generically limt!1(kt; cct ; rt; q1t) does not exist. I.e., it may be that some of these variables
converge, but in general they cannot all converge. Thus, for this special utility function the hypotheses
of Judds theorem generically cannot be satised. The reason is as follows. If all these variables were to
converge, the proof of Judds theorem would apply so in the limit r =  (hence  = 0) and f 0(k) = +. The
latter condition would uniquely determine k (modied golden rule). Then, from (4c), q2t would converge
and its limit would satisfy v0(cw) = q1 + q2. Also, in the limit, (4b) would yield 1=k = q1 + q2. Hence
1=k = v0(cw) = v0
 
f(k)   k   k, where the last equality uses (2). This would impose a second
condition on k, in addition to f 0(k) =  + . Only in exceptional cases will the same value of k satisfy both
these conditions. Generically there will be no k that satises both. Nonetheless, (4) is still valid  it still
characterizes the solution to the optimal tax problem when u = log. The fact that (generically) its variables
do not all converge is neither here nor there.
Given the simplications associated with u = log, Lansing states directly the optimal tax problem for
this special case:
maximize
Z 1
0
e t[v
 
f(kt)  kt   rtkt

+ log(kt)]dt
subject to _kt = (rt   )kt
rt  0
with k0 > 0 given. The _cct equation is dropped because it is redundant. Thus the _kt equation has a dual role.
Not only is it the capital accumulation equation; it is also the consumption Euler equation for the capitalist.
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem isH(k; r; q3; ) = v
 
f(k) k rk+log(k)+q3(r )k+r.
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The optimality conditions are
@H=@k = v0(cwt )[f
0(kt)     rt] + 1=kt + q3t(rt   ) = q3t   _q3t (5a)
@H=@r =  v0(cwt )kt + q3tkt + t = 0 (5b)
@H=@q3 = (rt   )kt = _kt (5c)
trt = 0; lim
t!1 e
 tq3tkt = 0 (5d)
with k0 given. In Lansing (1999), this appears as (21) on page 435. Note the new notation q3t for the co-state
here in (5). Since the _kt equation has a dual role here so does its co-state.4 Indeed q3t is distinct from both
of the co-states in (4), q1t (for capital) and q2t (for the capitalists consumption). However, they are related
to one another.
3.2 Lemma Equations (4) and (5) are equivalent, with
q3t = q1t + q2t (6)
ktq1t   k0q10 = t+ ktq3t   k0q30   
Z t
0
ksq3sds (7)
ktq2t   k0q20 =  t=+
Z t
0
ksq3sds (8)
where the initial conditions in (7) and (8) satisfy q10 + q20 = q30.
Proof First, given a solution to (4), verify that (5) is satised when q3t is dened by (6). Clearly (5b)
follows from (4c), (5c) follows from (4d), and (5d) follows from (4f). Given (4a), (5a) will be satised if
1=kt + _q3t + q3t(rt   )  q3t = _q1t + q1t(rt   ): (9)
Use (6) to substitute for q3t and _q3t:
1=kt + _q1t +  _q2t + (q1t + q2t)(rt   2) = _q1t + q1t(rt   ):
This is satised by (4b).
Next, given a solution to (5), verify that (4) is satised when q1t and q2t are dened by (7) and (8) with
q10 +q20 = q30. Take (7) and add to it (8) multiplied by  to get (6). Hence (4c) follows from (5b). Clearly,
(4d) and (4e) follow from (5c), while (4a) will follow from (5a) if (9) holds. To verify (9), rst take the time
derivative of (7):
_ktq1t + kt _q1t = 1 + _ktq3t + kt _q3t   ktq3t:
4Cf Lansing (1999) where the same notation q1t is used for the dual role co-state in (21) on page 435 and also for capitals
co-state in (17) on page 432 where utility is not restricted to be logarithmic.
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Substitute for _kt from (5c):
(rt   )ktq1t + kt _q1t = 1 + (rt   )ktq3t + kt _q3t   ktq3t:
Now divide through by kt to get (9). To verify (4b), rst take the time derivative of (8):
_ktq2t + kt _q2t =  1=+ ktq3t:
Substitute for _kt from (5c), and, since (7) and (8) yield (6), also substitute for q3t from (6). The result
is (4b) multiplied through by kt. Finally, (4f) follows from (7), (8), (5d), and, if necessary, application of
lHopitals rule to limt!1
R t
0
ksq3sds=e
t.
3.3 Theorem (Lansing)5 Suppose a solution to (5) has the property that kt, rt, and q3t converge as t tends
to innity, with strictly positive limits for kt, cwt , and f
0(kt)   . Then, dropping the time subscripts to
denote limiting values, sgn(k) = sgn
 
v0(cw)k   1.
Proof From (5c), r = . From (5b), q3 = v0(cw) since  = 0 (r > 0) and k > 0. Therefore, (5a) yields
v0(cw)[f 0(k)     r] = v0(cw)  1=k. The theorem now follows from rt = (1  kt)[f 0(kt)  ].
Judds hypotheses are more restrictive than Lansings. That is, in (4) Judds hypotheses are that kt, cct ,
rt, and q1t all converge. Recall that generically this does not happen, but when it does, 1=k = v0(cw). So
in this special case Lansings theorem yields k = 0 in the limit, just like Judds theorem: When u = log,
Judds theorem is a special (and exceptional) case of Lansings.
Furthermore, when Judds hypotheses are satised, q2t also converges by (4c). Hence, by (6), q3t converges
in (5). So Lansings hypotheses are satised. The converse does not necessarily hold. It is possible for q3t
to converge while q1t and q2t diverge. The following corollary states this formally.
3.4 Corollary Suppose a solution to (5) has the property that kt, rt, and q3t converge as t tends to innity,
with strictly positive limits for kt, cwt , and f
0(kt)  . Then, in (4),
lim
t!1 q1t=t = (1  kq3)=k = 1=k   v
0(cw)
lim
t!1 q2t=t = ( 1=+ kq3)=k =  1=k + v
0(cw)
where k = limt!1 kt, etc. So if v0(cw)k 6= 1 then both q1t and q2t fail to converge. Since sgn(k) =
sgn
 
v0(cw)k  1 from theorem 3:3, it follows that if k 6= 0 then q1t fails to converge so Judds hypotheses
are not satised.
Proof In (7) and (8), apply lHopitals rule to the integrals divided by t, and use q3 = v0(cw) from the
proof of theorem 3.3.
5See proposition 2 on page 435 of Lansing (1999).
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The following example rigs the initial conditions and parameter values to illustrate the corollary.
3.5 Example Suppose
v0(cw0 )[f
0(k0)     2] + 1=k0 = 0; y0 = f(k0)  k0   k0 > 0; 0 < f 0(k0)   6= : (10)
Then kt  k0, rt   (hence t  0), and q3t  v0(cw0 ) solves (5). So Lansings hypotheses are satised.
From (7) and (8), q1t = q10 + [1=k0 v0(cw0 )]t and q2t = q20  [1=k0 v0(cw0 )]t=, with q10 +q20 = q30 =
v0(cw0 ) by (6). So, from (10), q1t and q2t do not converge; but they do satisfy transversality. The tax rate
on capital income is not zero: kt[f 0(k0)  ] = f 0(k0)      6= 0.
Return now to the general case (3) when the capitalists utility is not necessarily u = log. As stated in
the introduction, the focus of attention is time paths for which the observables kt, cct , rt converge to positive
limits as t tends to innity. As a rst step, suppose the initial condition k0 is such that these observables
are time invariant: (kt; cct ; rt)  (k; cc; r). The behavior of the capital tax in this case will shed light on the
time varying case.
If (kt; cct ; rt)  (k; cc; r) then r =  from (3e) and cc = k from (3d). Also, cwt  cw = f(k)   k   k
from (2); assume this is positive. From (3a), q1t = q10  v0(cw)[f 0(k)    ]t. Then from (3c) (with t  0
since rt  ), q2t = ku00(k)[u0(k)] 1fq10   v0(cw)   v0(cw)[f 0(k)      ]tg. Note that transversality
is satised in (3f). All that remains is (3b), which reduces to u0(k)   q1t = q2t   _q2t. With the above
solutions for q1t and q2t, this requires that the coe¢ cients of t match up:
v0(cw)[f 0(k)     ] =  ku00(k)[u0(k)] 1v0(cw)[f 0(k)     ]
hence
v0(cw)[f 0(k)     ][1 + ku00(k)=u0(k)] = 0: (11a)
It also requires u0(k)  q10 = q20   _q2t:
u0(k)  q10 = ku00(k)[u0(k)] 1 f[q10   v0(cw)] + v0(cw)[f 0(k)     ]g
hence
q10[1 + ku
00(k)=u0(k)] = u0(k)  ku00(k)[u0(k)] 1v0(cw)[f 0(k)     2]: (11b)
The solution to (11a) and (11b) requires one of the following alternatives:
(i) f 0(k) = +  and ku00(k)=u0(k) 6=  1;
(ii) ku00(k)=u0(k) =  1 and u0(k) =  v0(cw)[f 0(k)     2].
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In each of these, the rst condition ensures that (11a) is satised, while the second ensures that (11b) is
satised. In particular, in (i) the second condition allows us to nd a unique value for q10 that satises (11b).
In (i), the capital tax is zero whereas in (ii), the capital tax is not restricted to be zero. Lansings example
with u = log is an instance of alternative (ii): the rst condition in (ii) is satised identically and the second
condition determines the value of k. (I.e., it determines the value of k0 that would lead to a time invariant
path.) When u 6= log, alternative (ii) would impose two distinct restrictions on k making it unlikely to have
any solution. Thus, other than u = log, alternative (ii) can be e¤ectively dismissed and this leaves us with
alternative (i)  zero tax on capital income.
These results for the time invariant case suggest the following for the time varying case.
3.6 Theorem Suppose a solution to (3) has the property that kt, cct , and rt converge as t tends to innity,
with strictly positive limits for kt, cct , and c
w
t . Then limt!1 kt = 0 or limt!1[c
c
t + u
0(cct)=u
00(cct)] = 0 or
both.
Proof From (3b) and (3e),
d
dt
[e tq2tu0(cct)=u
00(cct)] = e
 t [u
0(cct)]
2
u00(cct)
[q1t=u
0(cct)  1] :
Since u0(cct)=[c
c
tu
00(cct)] has a nite limit, transversality yields
 e tq2tu0(cct)=u00(cct) =
Z 1
t
e s
[u0(ccs)]
2
u00(ccs)
[q1s=u
0(ccs)  1]ds: (12)
In preparation for integration by parts, let zt :=
R1
t
e s[u0(ccs)]
2[u00(ccs)]
 1ds. From lHopitals rule,
limt!1[zt=e t] = limt!1[u0(cct)]
2[u00(cct)]
 1. This will be useful later. From (3a) and (3e) respectively,
e
Rt tq1t = q10   
R t
0
e
Rs sv0(cws )[f
0(ks)      rs]ds and e Rt t = u0(cc0)=u0(cct). Recall, Rt :=
R t
0
rsds is
cumulative interest. Therefore,
d
dt
[q1t=u
0(cct)  1] = [u0(cc0)] 1
d
dt
[e
Rt tq1t] =  [u0(cct)] 1v0(cwt )[f 0(kt)     rt]:
Apply integration by parts to (12):
 e tq2tu0(cct)=u00(cct) =
h
 zs[q1s=u0(ccs)  1]
i1
t
  
Z 1
t
zs[u
0(ccs)]
 1v0(cws )[f
0(ks)     rs]ds
= zt[q1t=u
0(cct)  1]  
Z 1
t
zs[u
0(ccs)]
 1v0(cws )[f
0(ks)     rs]ds:
The second line follows from transversality and the limiting behavior of zt. Use this equation to substitute
for q2tu0(cct)=u
00(cct) in (3c):
q1t[kt + e
tzt=u
0(cct)] = v
0(cwt )kt + e
tzt + e
t
Z 1
t
zs[u
0(ccs)]
 1v0(cws )[f
0(ks)     rs]ds  t: (13)
All terms on the right side of this equation converge as t tends to innity. In particular, lHopitals rule can
be applied to the integral divided by e t, while limt!1 t = 0 since limt!1 rt =  from (3e). Therefore,
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the left side must converge. The convergence of q1t would be su¢ cient for this to occur in which case Judds
theorem would apply so limt!1 kt = 0. But if q1t fails to converge, the required convergence of the left
side of (13) implies
0 = lim
t!1[kt + e
tzt=u
0(cct)] = 
 1 lim
t!1[c
c
t + u
0(cct)=u
00(cct)]
where the second equality uses limt!1 cct =  limt!1 kt from (3d, e), and also the earlier result regarding
the limiting behavior of zt.
3.7 Remark Consider the following cases of the theorem. If u = log, then in the proof zt =  e t= and
cct = kt, so, dropping time subscripts to denote limiting values, in the limit (13) yields: 0 = v
0(cw)k[f 0(k) 
  2] + 1 (apply lHopitals rule to the integral divided by e t) with cw = f(k)  k k. This determines
the steady state value(s) of k, and hence, by Lansings theorem, k. If u is any other CES function,
cc + u0(cc)=u00(cc) 6= 0, so k = 0. In this case, (13) determines q1, and k solves f 0(k) =  + . For general
u, if kt fails to converge to zero, k must satisfy k + u0(k)=u00(k) = 0, and (13) determines the limiting
behavior of the indeterminate form limt!1 q1t[kt + etzt=u0(cct)].
4 Conclusion
This paper has claried the relationship between the results of Judd (1985) and Lansing (1999). Judds
theorem states that in steady state the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero.6 Lansing identies a loga-
rithmic example of one of Judds models in which this tax rate can converge to any number, zero or otherwise
 the value depends on the models primitives (the workers utility function, the production function, etc).
It seems odd that the same model can generate two di¤erent results. The apparent contradiction is resolved
by observing that Lansing has relaxed the hypotheses of Judds theorem. With less restrictive hypotheses,
there are more possible outcomes. One would like to know if yet more outcomes are possible with yet less
restrictive hypotheses. Theorem 3.6 addresses this issue and characterizes all possible steady state outcomes
for this particular model. There are two, and only two, possibilities: the zero capital tax result is one, while
in any other steady state the capitalists marginal utility must have unitary elasticity. The latter possibility
is satised identically with logarithmic utility, which was the case considered by Lansing.
6Judd (1999, 2002) has returned to this issue, but not with the worker-capitalist model. The range of views on capital income
taxation can be exemplied by Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) on the one hand, and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) on
the other.
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